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ABSTRACT
Approached from the point of view of the basic processes that constitute the self-organiza-
tion of living systems, autonomy means the generation of identity and the minimal unity of a 
system, as a consequence of the self-production of internal components and processes of an 
organism, self-regulation of its internal variables, and self-sustaining of its internal resources. 
However, a living system is also a dynamical system, which means that the emergence of 
identity and the unity of the system is inseparable from the generation of its degrees of free-
dom. These degrees of freedom have different levels of complexity, given by the multidimen-
sional patterns instantiating them, offering various alternatives to respond to environmental 
perturbation. From the point of view of the multidimensionality of degrees of freedom of a 
living system, which depends on the degree of self-organization and complexity of the or-
ganism, one can distinguish three types of autonomy: minimal or basic autonomy, sensorimo-
tor autonomy, and strong autonomy. Put in these terms, autonomy depends on the abilities 
of the organism to access some degrees of freedom of higher complexity, to enhance its 
degrees of freedom by its coupling with the environment, as a result of its bodily skills, and 
to consciously control and monitorize its degrees of freedom, as a result of its higher-order 
cognitive abilities.
Keywords: self-organization, autonomy, degrees of freedom, dynamical system, autopoietic 
system.
RESUMO
Abordada do ponto de vista dos processos básicos que constituem a auto-organização dos 
sistemas vivos, autonomia significa geração de identidade e unidade mínima de um siste-
ma, como consequência da autoprodução de componentes internos e processos de um 
organismo, auto-regulação de suas variáveis  internas e auto-sustentação de seus recursos 
internos. No entanto, um sistema vivo é também um sistema dinâmico, o que significa que 
o surgimento da identidade e a unidade do sistema é inseparável da geração de seus graus 
de liberdade. Estes graus de liberdade têm diferentes níveis de complexidade, dados pelos 
padrões multidimensionais que os instanciam, oferecendo várias alternativas para responder 
à perturbação ambiental. Do ponto de vista da multidimensionalidade dos graus de liber-
dade de um sistema vivo, que depende do grau de auto-organização e complexidade do 
organismo, pode-se distinguir três tipos de autonomia: autonomia mínima ou básica, auto-
nomia sensório-motora e autonomia forte. Dito isto, a autonomia depende das capacidades 
Teodor Negru
Filosofia Unisinos – Unisinos Journal of Philosophy – 17(2): 121-131, may/aug 2016 122
Introduction
In terms of autopoietic theory, both in the classical 
version and in the later developments, autonomy designates 
a feature of living organisms, i.e., of biological systems with 
adaptive mechanisms, which have the capacity to self-sustain 
and survive under the conditions of environmental perturba-
tions. Autonomy is an emergent property of the self-organi-
sation of a living system as a principle that lies at the origin of 
the emergence of forms of life. Thus, autonomy is approached 
only from the perspective of constitutive processes of self-or-
ganisation, which contribute to creating basic organisms (cell- 
or unicellular-type organisms). However, the approach of in-
cipient forms of life, regarded as simple dynamical systems, 
does not solve the issue of understanding the autonomy of 
organisms with a much more complex organic architecture. 
Consequently, in this article this I intend to identify types 
of autonomy of living systems, taking into account the results 
of autopoietic theory, with further developments, as well as 
the living systems approach in terms of the dynamical system 
theory. Thus, in the first section, “Self-Organization and Au-
tonomy”, I will show how the basic processes of autopoiesis, 
have contributed to creating what we may call operational au-
tonomy. In the second section, “Self-organization and Degrees 
of Freedom in Dynamical Systems”, I will discuss the topic of 
self-organisation from the perspective of dynamical systems, 
showing that the self-organisation process is inseparable from 
the process of producing the system’s degrees of freedom. From 
here, I will define the autonomy of a living dynamical system in 
terms of the degrees of freedom it may access.
Finally, in the last sections, assuming the definition of 
autonomy in terms of degrees of freedom, and, considering 
the degrees of structural complexity of living systems, I will 
draw a distinction among three types of autonomy: minimal 
autonomy, which has been approached in different versions 
of autopoietic theory, sensorimotor autonomy, which belongs 
to organisms with minimal cognitive resources, and strong 
autonomy, which can be met in the case of organisms with 
higher-order cognitive skills. 
Self-organization and autonomy
The starting point of dynamical system theory in ap-
proaching living system is the theory of biological organisation, 
according to which biological organisms are the consequence 
of the spontaneous self-organisation of living matter, which is 
not governed by strict laws, nor is the consequence of an in-
ternal agent, such as a self (Thelen and Smith, 1998) or some 
external forces. Self-organization is the result of a propensity to 
order exhibited by living matter, whereby elementary particles 
are coupled in an on-going interaction, which determines the 
occurrence of some complex structures with emergent proper-
ties that can self-sustain considering external conditions.2 From 
this perspective, a self-organizing system is not only a mere as-
semblage of previously separate components, but entails their 
dynamic interaction in order to configure a new higher-order 
steady structure, with properties that cannot be reduced to in-
dividual properties of parts, and which would resist environ-
mental perturbations. Thus, the propensity of living organisms 
to self-organization determines the emergence of forms of life 
with different organic complexity, able to exhibit higher pat-
terns of behaviour as a response to environmental challenges 
that are decoupled from the basic mechanisms of their bio-
logical life. Consequently, one can say that living systems are 
self-organizing systems, which have the ability to self-maintain 
and adapt spontaneously to environmental circumstances, ex-
hibiting various degrees of organic complexity and autonomy. 
The emergence of autonomy of a living system should be 
understood starting from the constituent processes that are at 
the origin of its self-organization, such as the process of auto-
poiesis. In Maturana and Varela’s terms (1980), living systems 
as autopoietic machines are characterized by their constantly 
maintaining an internal organization, which entails the con-
tinuity of the organism’s internal processes without any other 
external goal. The process of autopoiesis consists of a network 
of recursive processes that regenerate and preserve internal 
components of the organism and thus, sustain the network 
of process that produces them. This means that what char-
acterizes autopoietic systems is operational unity or opera-
do organismo de aceder a alguns graus de liberdade de maior complexidade, de aumentar 
os seus graus de liberdade através do seu acoplamento com o ambiente, como resultado 
das suas capacidades corporais, e de controlar e monitorizar conscientemente seus graus de 
liberdade, como resultado de suas habilidades cognitivas de ordem superior.
Palavras-chave: auto-organização, autonomia, graus de liberdade, sistema dinâmico, sistema 
autopoiético.
2 In Thelen and Smith’s terms, “[s]elf-organization is not magic; it occurs because of the inherent nonlinearities in nearly all of our 
physical and biological universe” (Thelen and Smith, 1994, p. 58). In other words, self-organization is the consequence of the nonlinear 
relationship existing among the components of a system, which makes the interaction among the parts determine the emergence of 
some properties at the level of the whole that differ in quality. Unlike the classical, linear causality, which generates some “aggregative” 
systems, whose characteristics result from the simple addition of the properties of the components (Thompson, 2007, p. 419), nonlin-
ear causality allows the coupling and mixture of some processes or heterogeneous elements, which would lead to effects that differ 
structurally from their determining causes. Thus, nonlinearity means more than the simple reorganization of the elements as it allows for 
reaching levels of higher complexity that cannot be obtained by simply adding parts.
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tional closure, whereby the organism gains identity and unity. 
According to later enactivist approaches, the identity of an 
autonomous system is constituted by the recursiveness of the 
set of interdependent processes, which are self-sustaining and 
self-generating (Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008, p. 411), becom-
ing an invariant that persists through time and resists chang-
es caused by environmental perturbations on the organism.3 
Thus, the process of autopoiesis constitutes a unitary whole 
that self-creates the condition of its existence. 
By constituting its identity and unity a living system 
gains an operational autonomy given by the dynamics of its 
internal operations. This autonomy should be understood 
from the fact that an autopoietic system is always embed-
ded within a certain context, trying to sustain and preserve 
its identity and unity under the conditions of environmental 
fluctuations and perturbations. This means that an autopoi-
etic system is an open and homeostatic system, which op-
erates under precarious conditions.4 As an open system, an 
autopoietic system is characterized by an exchange of energy 
with the environment. Thus, it is a dissipative structure that, 
through its interaction with the environment, gets the energy 
required for its preservation; but it also consumes energy in 
order to sustain its internal organization, which is subjected to 
an on-going flow of energy exchange with the environment.5 
Depending on the quantity of energy received from exterior, 
the system may have moments of instability, reaching certain 
thresholds and overcoming them through the emergence of 
new levels of organization. 
From the point of view of the energy exchange with 
the environment, the system is considered to be far from a 
thermodynamic equilibrium, meaning that it never reaches 
equilibrium with the environment except by losing its iden-
tity, which occurs only by ceasing its activity. As an organ-
ism characterized by non-equilibrium, the living system has 
only a tendency toward equilibrium, undergoing states with a 
transient stability, which it reaches through on-going regula-
tion of its internal processes. 
An important role in this process is played by homeosta-
sis, which, as a feature of living systems, entails the regulariza-
tion of their internal variables with a view to constantly pre-
serving both the relationships among them and the response 
patterns determined by the relationship of the organism with 
the environment. Thus, homeostasis represents the propensi-
ty of the organism to maintain some recursive patterns, which 
are to preserve the autonomy of the system.
Moreover, according to later approaches to autopoiet-
ic theory, the autonomy of a living system would imply a 
boundary that is a result of the on-going interaction among 
the components, whereby the organism demarcates itself 
from the exterior and controls the energy flows coming from 
the environment (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004, p. 238). 
Boundaries facilitate the structural coupling between the 
system and the environment whereby the external structure 
of the system comes to be “as much as part of the complex 
system as the internal structure” ( Juarrero, 2010a, p. 2). In 
this way, the boundary internalizes the feedback, by sending 
to the organism signals about external perturbations, which 
determines the adjustment of its internal reactions in com-
pliance with the environmental modifications. It follows 
that this boundary, which is a result of self-organization, 
being generated endogenously, is a structure whose sensibil-
ity is adapted to external changes, making the organism an 
open system with different possibilities for interacting with 
the environment. 
Starting from this, one can conclude that an autonomous 
autopoietic system is an open system, embedded within a cer-
tain context, which is in a dynamical non-equilibrium with it, 
whose internal mechanism aims at generating its own com-
ponents and internal relations with a view to preserving them 
and, at the same time, generating its own identity and unity 
by creating a boundary that demarcates the organism from 
the external environment. Such a system is characterized by 
an operational autonomy, which represents a weak form of 
self-governance, to the extent that even if it is produced by 
the system and makes self-preservation its goal (Collier, 2002, 
p. 1), it does not involve a conscious regulation of the organic 
processes or achieving an external goal.6 Operational autono-
my is a consequence of the self-organization of living system, 
and, therefore, should be understood through its constituent 
processes. From this perspective, operational autonomy con-
sists in generating identity and the minimal unity of a system, 
as a consequence of the self-production of the internal com-
ponents and processes of the organism, self-regulation of its 
internal variables, and self-sustaining of its internal resources.
3 Autonomy entails the existence of an operational identity of the organism irrespective of its level of activity. “Autonomy as operational 
closure is intended to describe self-generated identities at many possible levels” (Di Paolo and Iizuka, 2008, p. 411).
4 Di Paolo and Iizuka state that “[b]y precarious we mean the fact that in the absence of the organization of the system as a network of 
processes, under otherwise equal physical conditions, isolated component processes would tend to run down or extinguish” (Di Paolo 
and Iizuka, 2008, p. 411).
5 However, in some dissipative structures, boundary conditions are either imposed from the outside (as Bénard cells) (Juarrero, 2009, 
p. 91), or insufficiently controlled (Collier, 2004, p. 153). This means that these dissipative structures are characterised by an exogenous 
autonomy, which requires an external control of boundary conditions, and not by an endogenous autonomy, which is the exclusive result 
of their internal processes.
6 One can speak of a more advanced form of self-governance in the case of an adaptive autopoietic system, which actively monitors its 
own states and acts towards improving the circumstances of the autopoietic process (Di Paolo et al., 2010, p. 50). A system with proper-
ties such as self-monitoring, control of internal regulation, and control of external exchanges (Di Paolo, 2005, p. 430) has the possibility 
of a better adaptation to the environment by means of complex behaviour, which aims at achieving its own goals and not just a direct 
adjustment to the exterior perturbation.
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Self-organization and degrees of 
freedom in dynamical systems
The idea behind the theory of self-organization in 
the dynamical system approach is that the interaction of 
elementary particles has as a consequence a cohesion be-
tween parts owing to the generation of an orderly pattern 
of behaviour, which takes over control of the system at a 
certain moment, constraining the degrees of freedom of the 
components to join them in a functional whole, giving up 
some of their possibilities to act. The emergent organization 
of the system is a result of its multi-causal character (Thel-
en and Smith, 1998, p. 281), according to which the mutual 
influence of the parts, endowed with causal powers, deter-
mines the expansion of the internal processes, cancelling the 
pre-existing order through the emergence of a higher-or-
der structure, which endows the organism with the ability 
to respond to environmental perturbationswhich the 
components, separately, did not have. Structurally speaking, 
self-organization is the consequence of the circular causality 
relationship of the system (Lewis, 2002, p. 41), which means 
that the cohesion of the basic elements generates a high-
er-order pattern, which in turn determines the cohesion of 
its parts. Circular causality shows that self-organization is 
an on-going process, where the higher and bottom levels of 
the system generate and influence one another, determining 
the stability of the system as a whole as a result of the in-
ternal dynamics of the components. This circular dynamics 
is at the origin of the constitution of organism identity and 
maintenance of equilibrium, under the influence of energy 
perturbations coming from the environment.
This means that as dynamical systems, self-organizing 
systems are not invariable but evolve in time, alternating mo-
ments of instability with stability. In terms of the dynamical 
system theory, one can say that the factors influencing the sys-
tem, called parameters, operate on its variables, which are in 
an interdependent relation, determining their simultaneous 
modification and the change of the system state (Van Gelder, 
1998, p. 617). The variables of the system have an on-going 
dynamic and, due to their coupling with various external pa-
rameters, their evolution can be explained by a set of math-
ematical equations.7 It results in the system being character-
ized by several states, which correspond to the alternatives to 
modify its variables, which, together, form the state space of 
the system. State space is a representation, in a system of co-
ordinates, of all the acting and responding possibilities that 
the system could have in its history.
Due to the influence of parameters on the internal vari-
ables, the system exhibits moments of instability, depending 
on the external fluctuations that threaten its internal orga-
nization. In phase transition, which is the transition from 
one steady state to another, the system is oriented towards 
the discovery of some new self-organizing patterns (Kelso 
and Engstrøm, 2006, p. 116) by means of a control param-
eter, which is a transitive pattern that opens the possibility 
of the system to self-organize in new possible configurations. 
Control parameter merely facilitates the transition from the 
old organization to the new one, ensuring the adaptation 
of the system to the new conditions, without imposing any 
order pattern. The configuration of the system in a steady 
state is the result of the emergence of a self-organizing pat-
tern as an order parameter or collective variable, which takes 
over control and coordinates the variables of the system at 
a certain moment, determining the reduction of the degrees 
of freedom of its components (Kelso and Engstrøm, 2006, 
p. 115-116) to only few alternatives to act. Thus, order pa-
rameters define the degrees of freedom of the whole system, 
which are gained by condensing the degrees of freedom of its 
components, as a result of the adaptation to the perturbations 
caused by the external parameters.
An order parameter determines the system to set-
tle into one or a few patterns of behaviour (Thelen and 
Smith, 1994, p. 58), which means that, from a topological 
approach, it configures a certain pattern in the system’s state 
space, made up of points in this space corresponding to the 
states of the system that could be occupied at a given mo-
ment. This means that the system comes to be guided by 
an attractor, which corresponds to the trajectory a pattern 
of behaviour describes in the state space, which determines 
the position of the system as a response to the external per-
turbations. The system state space contains a number of fi-
nite attractorsthe less they are, the more organized and 
steady the system is considered (Newton, 2000, p. 94)of 
which only some are active at a certain moment, meaning 
that they influence the behaviour of the system. Depending 
on the external perturbations and on how strong these pat-
terns are, as a result of giving appropriate responses to the 
challenges of the system, the system oscillates between these 
attractors, which are “the total number of alternative long-
term behaviours of the system” (Kauffman, 1993, p. 177), 
representing the degrees of freedom of the system. 
Some attractors have a regular configuration, describing 
a determined orderly pattern with a uniform trajectory. Such 
examples are point attractors, which determine the stability 
of the system by its convergence toward a steady point in its 
state space. Periodic attractors belong to the same category, 
having a cyclic trajectory and taking the shape of a periodic 
loop (Juarrero, 1999, p. 154), which always reverts to its ini-
tial state by occupying repeatedly the same positions.
Other attractors, such as chaotic (or strange) attrac-
tors, have an irregular trajectory, but not non-coherent, 
which does not pass through the same points in the state 
space but occupies convergent positions against the previ-
7 Equations represent rules of evolution (Van Gelder and Port, 1995, p. 6) of the variables. Consequently, a dynamical system operates 
according to certain deterministic sequences where each state of the system is a consequence of a previous state.
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ously covered trajectories.8 The trajectory of strange attrac-
tors is not random, but it has a higher degree of complexity 
as it corresponds to a higher order. Unlike point or periodic 
attractors, which are zero- or uni-dimensional (Kauffman, 
1993, p. 178), strange attractors are multidimensional, as 
they are able to have many coordinates represented by the 
variables of the system.9
Thus, beyond the overall degrees of freedom resulting 
from the configuration of the operational space of the system, 
represented by state space, attractors, depending on their di-
mensionality, instantiate these degrees of freedom, which de-
pend on the number of variables that are affected by the par-
ticular situation in which the system is embedded. Point and 
periodic attractors instantiate simple degrees of freedom, which 
include a limited number of alternatives for responding to en-
vironmental perturbations. Strange attractors characterizing 
higher-complex systems have higher-order degrees of freedom, 
which offer multiple alternatives to respond and adapt.
To conclude, the self-organization of a dynamical sys-
tem involves reaching the stability of the system by means 
of an emergence from the interaction of the components of 
some self-sustaining operational patterns that can maintain 
the identity of the system in spite of external perturbations. 
These operational patterns define the degrees of freedom of 
the system from whose association the autonomy of the sys-
tem results.
From the point of view of the part–whole relation-
ship, the circularity that is at the origin of the system’s 
self-organization determines the degrees of freedom of the 
system. The cohesion of the parts and their coordination 
with a view to adopting a unitary behaviour is due to the 
constraints within the system, which, by means of a dou-
ble dynamics, i.e., endogenous and exogenous, determines 
the generation of a systemic whole, whose causal powers are 
exercised on the parts. From the point of view of dynami-
cal system theory, the role of constraints within a system is 
explained by Juarrero’s theory (1999, 2010b), which draws 
a distinction between constraints that limit the response 
options of the system, namely context-free constraints, and 
constraints that enable one to find new ways to act, namely 
context-sensitive constraints. Constraints imposed on the 
system from the exterior, which belong to the first category, 
determine the system to change from a state of equiproba-
bility and independence, where anything can happen, to a 
determined state that reduces the degrees of freedom of the 
system to one alternative from the previous ones, whereas it 
cancels the others. If there are no new options for response, 
context-free constraints are limitative as they cannot be at 
the origin of the emergence of complexity, which offers a 
higher-order self-organization to the system.
Different to constraints that only push the system to-
ward a certain state that is to be abandoned as soon as the 
external pressure disappears, Juarrero (1999, 2010b) stresses 
the importance of context-sensitive constraints, which are the 
result of relations set up between the parts of the system as a 
consequence of adding them. In this case, the consequence 
of cohesion is the interdependence of elementary parti-
cles, whose behaviour undergoes qualitative modifications 
within the newly created ensemble. Thus, context-sensitive 
constraints determine the emergence of new properties and 
generation of some higher-complex levels, which “enlarge the 
variety of states the system as a whole can access” ( Juarrero, 
1999, p. 138).
This is possible because context-sensitive constraints 
operate both bottom-up, by generating the conditions for the 
emergence of a higher organization, and top-down, by gener-
ating the boundary conditions that operate on the lower lev-
el. First, one can speak of first-order contextual constraints, 
which operate toward synchronising and correlating the par-
ticles that are at the same level of complexity. By coupling the 
components, first-order contextual constraints determine 
the emergence of a new operational space of the system, with 
more degrees of freedom than its components, which opens 
new response alternatives to the whole. Second, one can 
speak of second-order contextual constraints that are the re-
sult of the influence exercised by the new emergent level on 
its components so that they can behave in certain way. Thus, 
second-order contextual constraints represent the closing 
loop of the circularity relation among the levels of the system, 
whereby the higher-order pattern controls top-down the 
bottom level generating it.10 In other words, the second-or-
der contextual constraints restrain the degrees of freedom of 
the parts by diminishing the state space of the components 
( Juarrero, 2010b, p. 262) and increasing the probability of 
occurrence of certain events ( Juarrero, 1999, p. 146), by con-
figuring the bottom level according to the new higher organi-
zation of the system. Thus, new and higher-order degrees of 
freedom emerge in the system. 
The result is that, according to Juarrero (1999), self-or-
ganization, due to first-order contextual constraints that op-
erate locally at the level of the elementary particles, determin-
ing their cohesion, generates a new structure endowed with 
higher-order causal powers. The new structure operates glob-
ally on the ensemble of particles, conveying on them a differ-
8 Attractors have a basin of attraction, which includes the sum of the possible states to be occupied that are determined by that order 
pattern. In the case of strange attractors, due to their unpredictable character it is difficult to know, even in probabilistic terms, what 
position in the basin of attraction is to be occupied by the system.
9 Strange attractors can also occupy intermediate positions between two dimensions. This means that their multidimensionality is fractal 
in the sense that it can be expressed by fractions and not as an integer (Kauffman, 1993, p. 179; Ward, 2002, p. 213).
10 The part-whole relationship is described in terms of top-down causation (Juarrero, 2009, p. 89) or downward causation (Thompson, 
2007, p. 426) whereby one can understand the causal efficacy of the higher level, which operates by structuring the lower level, in the 
sense of modelling and limiting the state space of the components according to the requirements of the higher emergent organization.
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ent dynamics and having as a consequence the generation of 
a unitary and systemic whole. In other words, self-organiza-
tion involves the dynamics of circularity between first-order 
contextual constraints that generate new degrees of freedom, 
enlarging the system state space ( Juarrero, 1999, p. 145), and 
second-order contextual constraints that reduce the degrees 
of freedom of the components by reuniting and configuring 
them in more complex structures, which offer the system 
greater alternatives for responding do its parts.11
Put in these terms, one can say that first-order con-
straints generate first-order degrees of freedom, which entail 
the sum of all states that could be occupied by the new emer-
gent whole. Whereas second-order constraints determine 
second-order degrees of freedom, which are a consequence 
of the complexity of the patterns that are configured in the 
multidimensional state space of the system. Thus, second-or-
der contextual constraints correspond to the order parame-
ters that, as organizing patterns, compress or enslave (Thel-
en, 1995, p. 57) the degrees of freedom of the components 
with a view to the emergence of certain behavioural patterns, 
with basins of attraction deeper than the components of the 
system have separately. The depth of these basins of attrac-
tion, which give dimensionality to attractors, is given by the 
number of system coordinates, which represent the variables 
that contribute to the generation of this pattern. Thus, the 
degrees of freedom of the system are not determined by the 
positions that could be occupied in the new operational space 
of the system, resulting from the addition of the degrees of 
freedom of the components, but rather by the dimensionality 
and complexity of the patterns that bring together the states 
included in this operational space.12
As a result, self-organization involves the generation of 
a new hierarchy of levels where transition to a higher level 
of organization creates the possibility of accessing some in-
creasingly complex degrees of freedom by adding new co-
ordinates in the state space, which are represented by the 
system variables. This means that self-organization involves 
generating and re-generating constraints that modulate the 
flow of energy and contribute to the recursive maintenance 
of the organism (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004, p. 241). 
In the process of generating constraints whereby the organ-
ism self-creates the rules for its organization, the living sys-
tem self-regulates the degrees of freedom of its components. 
By regulating and modulating the degrees of freedom of its 
parts, the system creates its degrees of freedom as a whole. 
In this way, one can define the degrees of freedom of the 
system as representing the number of possible positions or 
states the system can occupy, considering its independent 
variables, without breaking the exogenous or endogenous 
constraints it undergoes.
To conclude, it results from the convergent approaches 
of the dynamical system theory in topological terms and from 
the part–whole relationship perspective, whereby through 
self-organization the degrees of freedom of the system are 
produced, which together give its degree of autonomy. This 
means that the processes underlying self-organization and 
autonomy should be understood from the perspective of the 
production of degrees of freedom of the system. Thus, in 
terms of dynamical systems theory the autonomy of a living 
system means the self-production (autopoiesis) of its degrees 
of freedom, the self-regulation of the degrees of freedom of 
its components, and the self-sustaining of internal processes 
in order to maintain and to enlarge the degree of freedom of 
the system. Consequently, the emergence of identity and uni-
ty of the system is inseparable from generating its degrees of 
freedom, whose level of complexity, given by the multidimen-
sional patterns instancing them, offer varied alternatives for 
responding to environmental perturbations.
Types of autonomy in self-
organizing systems
Approaching the autonomy of living organisms in gen-
eral, it can be inferred that this is a gradual matter given by the 
self-organization level of the organism and by the complexity 
of the degrees of freedom the organism has gained.13 From 
the point of view of the process of autopoiesis, which means 
the generation of the system’s organization, the degree of au-
tonomy of a living system is a consequence of the way it reg-
ulates and modulates its internal processes in order to adapt 
to environmental conditions. For highly organized organisms, 
the question of degrees of autonomy is raised in terms of 
the ability to control their degrees of freedom due to their 
mechanisms for adaptation to environment. As a result the 
degree of autonomy of a living system is given by the degree 
11 This means that self-organization operates according to the principle “the whole is more than the sum of its parts” (Baumeister and 
Vonasch, 2011), which means that the degrees of freedom of the system as a whole are not only a mere addition of degrees of freedom 
of its components, as the former are of an higher level. The system, owing to the emergent properties, has degrees of freedom that 
provide a higher degree of autonomy than that of its parts. From this perspective, self-organization as a consequence faces not just the 
limitation of the degrees of freedom of the system components, but also the increasing complexity of the degrees of freedom of the 
system and in this way its autonomy.
12 The possibility of accessing the states contained in this operational space is also the consequence of the complex abilities of the sys-
tem that can determine the emergence of some strange attractors with higher-order degrees of freedom.
13 Self-organization involves creating new hierarchic levels where each level has a certain degree of complexity. These levels, which are 
interconnected, provide increasingly developed degrees of autonomy so that the lower levels (e.g., material) are less autonomous, 
whereas the higher levels, which are supported by the lower ones (e.g., cognitive level), could have a greater level of autonomy (Collier, 
2004, p. 166-167).
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of complexity of the organism’s mechanisms, whose role is to 
maintain its identity and equilibrium with the environment.
Starting from these premises, it is difficult to quantify the 
degrees of autonomy characterizing the living systems, their di-
versity being a consequence of the heterogeneity of living king-
doms, where each organism exhibits its own kind of autonomy. 
However, referring to the multidimensionality of the degrees 
of freedom of a living system, which depends on the degree of 
self-organization and complexity of the organism, one can dis-
tinguish three types of autonomy: minimal or basic autonomy, 
sensorimotor autonomy, and strong autonomy.
Minimal autonomy
Constitutive autonomy of the system (Froese et al., 2007; 
Froese and Ziemke, 2009), or minimal autonomy (Barandi-
aran and Moreno, 2008), is the result of the metabolic activity 
of the organism that generates a minimal identity constituted 
by the biological processes that sustain the existence of the liv-
ing system. This minimal identity does not involve complex 
biological structures that would offer self-awareness to the or-
ganism, rather it is a consequence of the (internal) recursive 
patterns forming at the level of the organism as a result of the 
constitutive processes.14 Constitutive autonomy involves gen-
erating an identity as a consequence of the operational closure 
of the organism, whereby it experiences an on-going self-con-
stituting process in order to prevent its disintegration (Froese 
and Di Paolo, 2011, p. 6).
Preserving the minimal identity of the organism also 
involves a physical boundary, which separates the organism 
from the environment, thus becoming a prerequisite for the 
emergence of its constitutive or basic autonomy (Ruiz-Mira-
zo and Moreno, 2004, p. 241-247). The basic type of biolog-
ical boundary is the membrane, whose purpose is, on one 
hand, to protect the internal processes of the system against 
environmental perturbations, and, on the other hand, to con-
trol the energy flows necessary to its functioning. Membrane 
demarcates the space necessary to the system so that its basic 
processes, which regulate its internal responses and through 
which it communicates with the external worldi.e., cataly-
sis and energy currencies, are able to function, as the mem-
brane is a boundary with selective permeability and with 
channels of interaction with the environment, as the result of 
local and global constraints (Ruiz-Mirazo and Moreno, 2004, 
p. 245; Moreno and Etxeberria, 2005, p. 163). This means, 
on one hand, that membrane is the consequence of internal 
constraints resulting from the cohesion of the elementary 
particles and from reactions that connect these particles, and, 
on the other, that it has causal powers exercising top-down 
constraints on the basic level by aggregating the elementary 
particles into a functional whole that contributes to carrying 
out the same tasks (i.e., the survival of the system within its 
environment). Thus, membrane is the consequence of en-
dogenous and exogenous constraints that are at the origin of 
the system’s self-organization, playing an important role in its 
adaptation. Owing to its sensitivity to changes in the system 
environment, it provides a basic form of coupling and inter-
action between organism and the environment in which it is 
embedded, so that the living system can preserve its identity 
and unity.
Consequently, constitutive or minimal autonomy is 
the level of autonomy that characterizes living systems 
with minimal forms of life, which offer responses to the 
environmental perturbations only by changing their in-
ternal organization. Such organisms respond to external 
changes only at a metabolic level, determining the activa-
tion of some adapting processes with a view to preserving 
the biological integrity of the system (Moreno et al., 1997, 
p. 115). This means that systems with minimal autonomy 
have the ability to give automatic responses to the external 
perturbations, which are the consequence of the mecha-
nisms that would ensure the survival of the organism. In 
this case, one can speak of a metabolic agency (Moreno 
and Etxeberria, 2005, p. 163) as a form of agency charac-
terizing a biological organism, which, even if not endowed 
with self-reflective abilities, has basic intentionality, given 
by the orientation of the living system toward its environ-
ment in order to find the resources required to work prop-
erly and preserve its basic functions.15
Consequently, minimal autonomyas a basic form of 
autonomy of living systemsis not a gradual property of 
an organism (Froese et al., 2007, p. 459) but comes from the 
internal biological processes of a living system with a basic 
structure that generates minimal forms of identity and uni-
ty. Minimal autonomy is a property of the biological domain, 
i.e., of living forms that do not possess cognitive abilities, not 
even incipient ones. In terms of the dynamical system theo-
ry, minimal autonomy is constituted by simple recursive pat-
terns, existing at the level of the system, which generate an 
order parameter with lower complexity instantiating simple 
degrees of freedom.
14 From this perspective, Thompson (2007, p. 260) also speaks of a kind of biologic self, “because the dynamics of the system is charac-
terized by an invariant topological pattern that is recursively produced by the system and that defines an outside to which the system 
is actively and normatively related”.
15 Such an agent, understood in the minimal sense, would be defined as “an autonomous organization that adaptatively regulates its 
coupling with its environment and contributes to sustaining itself as a consequence” (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 367). In other words, a 
minimal or biological agent is not only the passive receiver of changes in the world but also has the possibility of regulating the flow of 
information coming from the world, which means that it uses the information received from the environment for its own adaptation (Di 
Paolo, 2005, p. 443). Therefore, it is also called an adaptive agent, its aims being to adapt to the environment, which entails maintaining 
some recursive interactions with the environment (Froese and Di Paolo, 2011, p. 10).
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Sensorimotor autonomy
Unlike organisms with simple organization, which have 
a basic coupling with the world based on the regulation of the 
organism’s internal responses, organisms with a nervous sys-
tem achieve adaptation through the world’s being enacted in 
a dynamic feedback loop, by connecting sensory processes to 
motor ones, which opens the organism to the possibility of 
a nonlinear interaction with the world. From the biological 
point of view, there is a great difference between organisms 
characterized by minimal autonomy and those with a ner-
vous system. This means that the degree of complexity of the 
latter determines the emergence of a level different from the 
metabolic one, with different dynamics (Moreno and Etxe-
berria, 2005, p. 167) that offers the system the possibility of 
accessing other degrees of freedom. This new level, which 
is dependent on the metabolic one, exercises constraints on 
the latter, determining new behaviours to appear through the 
emergence of some new degrees of freedom that would ex-
pand the system’s alternatives to respond.
In other words, the nervous system, by coupling the 
sense organs with effectors, integrates the agent into a mobile 
unity (Thompson, 2007, p. 244), beyond the biological one, 
which generates some new patterns of action. The organism’s 
coupling with the world is no longer achieved by means of a 
physical boundary, which, as an interface, facilitates exchang-
ing of energy with the surrounding world. But owing to the 
nervous system, the organism is integrated into the world 
through some sensorimotor loops that reunite the internal 
processes, the body, and the world in a dynamical pattern. 
Thus, perception is detached from the metabolic responses 
of the organism, being connected with its movement abili-
ty,16 the two mutually conditioning one another: perception 
is influenced by the position and movements of the body, and 
the movements of the body are determined by the need for 
orientation within the environment, which results from the 
organism’s needs to adapt and survive.
In other words, the organism’s perceptual space is struc-
tured according to the opportunities to act that are identi-
fied in the environment. This means that organisms do not 
perceive the world in a neutral way, but objects around us 
are perceived according to their utility in accomplishing 
our actions. The consequence of the organism’s sensorimo-
tor coupling with the environment is the perception of the 
world according to the affordances (Gibson, 1977) which 
help the organism to achieve its goals. In terms of the dy-
namical system theory, affordances facilitate the attractors of 
the dynamical cycle perception–action by integrating the or-
ganism-environment system in a dynamic pattern of action. 
Affordances do not involve higher-order cognitive abilities, 
but they are a non-inferential and non-representational way 
of perceiving the world from the perspective of the senso-
rimotor abilities of the organism. These abilities demarcate 
the space of action of the organism within the environment, 
called its niche, which consists of all the affordances perceived 
(Silberstein and Chemero, 2011, p. 7).17
Consequently, sensorimotor abilities determine the 
emergence of a different type of agency, which does not mere-
ly involve the regulation of the internal processes but also a 
new way of relating the organism to the world, whereby the 
former does not based only on internal adaptive reactions 
alone, but also by gaining information that would improve 
its abilities to act. Owing to the sensorimotor loop, organisms 
exercise a feedback control (or closed-loop control) on their 
variables, where “the inputs provided to the system depend 
on its current outputs, which are often affected by the current 
circumstances” (Eliasmith, 2009, p. 137), which means that 
the world of the organism is continuously constituted anew, 
by revealing new ways of acting in the world. Thus, the rela-
tion of a sensorimotor agent with the world is characterized 
by what Merleau-Ponty (2005) calls an intentional arc, which 
corresponds to the set of bodily skills, whereby an organism 
responds to changes in the world, directly, without the need 
for cognitive representations. In other words, the world is per-
ceived at the pre-reflective level in terms of the motor abili-
ties of the organism, which involves only direct responses and 
spontaneous adjustment to changes in the world, without the 
need for cognitive reflective abilities. 
Even if sensorimotor coupling does not involve high-
er-order cognitive abilities, and sometimes not even a nervous 
system (Van Duijn et al., 2006), one can speak in this case of 
a basic or minimal cognition. This is a basic embodied cogni-
tion, which entails that information from the environment 
is processed by the sensorimotor structures and transformed 
into motor impulses that lead to the performance and success 
of an action. This means that, through the sensorimotor cou-
pling with the world, the organism receives information nec-
essary for its adaptation since it has access to a new epistemic 
level, beyond the one generated by the metabolic processes 
(Etxeberria et al., 1994). Moreover, motility, together with 
the emergence of the nervous system, leads to a higher orga-
nization of the organism and to the generation of some cog-
nitive phenomena, such as emotions and awareness (Moreno 
and Etxeberria, 2005, p. 170).
Consequently, sensorimotor autonomy entails that or-
ganisms are endowed with basic cognitive resources. They are 
16 One can also speak about incipient forms of motility in the case of simple organisms, which lack a nervous system; but in this case, 
motility is merely a result of metabolic processes, i.e. “an extension of the set of mechanisms that are required for self-maintenance” 
(Moreno and Etxeberria, 2005, p. 167).
17 From this perspective, sensorimotor abilities depend on the autonomy of the organism, which involves “the maintenance appropriate 
relations among the nervous system, the body and the environment, i.e., the maintenance of affordances and the cognitive-phenome-
nological niche” (Silberstein and Chemero, 2011, p. 10).
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capable of behaviour, which means that they not only simply 
offer a response as a result of constitutive coupling with the 
environment, they actually control their interactions with 
the environment and can pursue the achievement of some 
goals external to themselves (Di Paolo, 2005). Such an or-
ganism, with a multicellular architecture, whose adaptation 
relies on motility and whose body is controlled by a nervous 
system, is characterized by behavioural agency (Barandiaran 
and Moreno, 2008, p. 336). This type of agency entails a type 
of autonomy, which even if it involves detachment from the 
metabolic level, entails the coupling of the organism with the 
world with simple patterns such as cycle attractors, which 
have degrees of freedom with lower dimensionality. As a re-
sult, although sensorimotor autonomy enhances the degrees 
of freedom of the organism by detecting new possibilities to 
act within the environment, it remains dependent on the re-
sponses to external perturbations without instantiating any 
higher-order behavioural pattern.
Strong autonomy
In case of the beings with higher-order cognitive skills, 
one can speak of strong autonomy, which characterizes an 
agent that has the ability to control its alternatives to respond 
and to be consciously aware of its degrees of freedom. This 
means that beings with higher-order cognitive skills have 
the possibility to choose their own goals, independently of 
environmental conditions or immediate organic needs, can 
imagine plans with regard to future actions, and can conduct 
counterfactual reasoning, imagining situations where things 
could have happened differently (Wilson, 2002, p. 626). This 
is possible as such organisms have the advantage of operating 
with offline cognition, owing to the existence of a higher-or-
der level, besides the biological and sensorimotor ones, which 
has the ability to process information and create responses 
to environmental perturbations, detached from the energet-
ic current flow to which the organism is exposed. In other 
words, organisms with higher-order cognitive abilities are ca-
pable of ideomotor action, which does not represent a mere 
response to external events (i.e., stimulus-based actions), 
but involves behaving according to some internal aims and 
thoughts (Waszak et al., 2010, p. 185).
Higher-order cognitive skills are the consequence of the 
complexity of the brain, which has the possibility to create 
patterns of action in a nonlinear way (Kelso, 1997, p. 257). 
The brain of such an advanced organism is itself a dynamical 
system, which it self-organizes through the large-scale inte-
gration of neurons situated in various areas of the brain, in 
patterns that determine responses by causing a certain be-
haviour in the organism. This property of the brain whereby 
autonomous parts can interact and influence one another, 
creating a pattern of action without losing its independence 
or part thereof, is called metastability (Kelso and Tognoli, 
2009, p. 107). In the metastable regime, the brain creates a 
dynamic state space whose coordinates are given by the non-
linear interaction of its regions with various functions, which 
determines the emergence of patterns with higher-order de-
grees of freedom.
In the same way as a dynamical system, the brain al-
ternates between states of instability and stability, by the 
emergence of some attractors, which, owing to the nervous 
system, participates in the sensorimotor cycle of coupling to 
the world, determining the emergence of some multidimen-
sional behavioural patterns. Such a brain is capable of strange 
attractors, with an unpredictable trajectory, which determine 
stochastic chaotic behaviour (Freeman, 1999, p. 153), with 
many and complex degrees of freedom. Moreover, the in-
ternal relation of circularity, which characterizes dynamical 
systems, acquires a semantic content ( Juarrero, 1999), owing 
to the emergence, by means of the aggregation of neurons, of 
a new metacognitive level that is consciousness. This appears 
to be a globally coherent activity operating as an order pa-
rameter (Freeman, 1999), which exercises top-down control, 
voluntarily and not automatically on the bottom level (Frith, 
2009, p. 203). Thus, consciousness facilitates awareness and 
coupling of the cognitive contents of our thoughts, which are 
the emergent properties of the patterns of action created at 
the level of neuronal ensembles.
Consciousness, as a biological phenomenon represent-
ing the highest level of cognitive complexity, is at the origin 
of another type of intentionality, different from the one based 
on bodily skills, which involves patterns of action with con-
scious content resulting from the coupling of the organism 
with the world. These patterns of action, generated by the 
higher cognitive level to determine the neuronal level to trig-
ger a certain behavioural response, are intentions. Intentions 
are not the direct causes of our actions but they play the role 
of context-sensitive constraints, being higher-dimensional, 
neurologically embodied attractors, which underlie several 
types of neurons, including the motor ones ( Juarrero, 2010b, 
p. 267); they play the role of structural causes, which guide 
our actions, programming our behaviour to act in a certain 
way within certain circumstances (Slors, 2013, p. 107). One 
can say that such intentions define the vector field of the sys-
tem, associating to each point in the system’s state space a di-
rection of movement, which will be followed in case such a 
pattern of action is activated.
Consequently, higher-order cognitive agents have the 
ability not only to monitor and regulate the responses of the 
organism that appear as bodily or cognitive patterns, but also 
to control behaviour through the possibility of including in-
tentions within medium and long-term action plans, which 
are beyond the immediate priorities of the organism. This is 
possible through regulating the living system’s own activity 
by voluntarily assuming certain norms, with no relation to 
the basic processes of the organism, but acquired from other 
forms of life (Barandiaran et al., 2009, p. 372). This means 
that, in the case of higher-order cognitive agents, not only is 
interaction with the environment important, so is interaction 
with similar beings, where new possibilities to extend the au-
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tonomy of the living system emerge. Beings with higher-order 
cognitive skills are capable of participatory sense-making (De 
Jaegher and Di Paolo, 2007), whereby they coordinate their 
actions, producing, together with other similar living systems, 
new significances and values that are not the consequence 
of the organism’s adaptability, but lay at the basis of the so-
cial and cultural world. In this new world of meanings, the 
agents, by choosing the values and norms to follow, have the 
possibility of reaching a new level of autonomy that cannot be 
achieved by any other biological organism.
Consequently, strong autonomy represents the highest 
level of autonomy that a biological being can reach, which in-
volves not only a new identity, but also a personal autonomy.18 
This is possible owing to the complexity of cognitive struc-
tures with which such organisms are endowed, which provide 
them with the ability of a higher-order control of their own 
actions and degrees of freedom as a result of the emergence 
of consciousness. Strong autonomy involves the conscious 
control of the multidimensional degrees of the freedom of 
the organism, which provides the organism with an unlimited 
and varied array of open-ended responses to environmental 
challenges.
Conclusion
To conclude, one of the consequences of the capacity of 
living matter to pursue self-organization is the emergence of 
autonomy of the living system. Consequently, any living sys-
tem has some autonomy, given by the level of its evolution as 
a biological organism and the complexity of its internal or-
ganization, which is given by the way it is coupled with the 
external world and controls its responses to environment per-
turbation. Taking into account that any living system is also a 
dynamical system, the result is that autonomy depends on the 
degree of freedom of the whole system, whereby the organ-
ism enhances its possibilities for adaptation to environment 
perturbations.
Therefore, the autonomy of an organism is a gradual 
problem that involves, in its minimal forms, the emergence 
and preservation of the organism’s identity and unity. This is 
minimal autonomy that is the result of constituting processes 
of self-organisation, which involves simple degrees of free-
dom. In organisms with a nervous system and minimal cogni-
tive resources, autonomy is defined in terms of second-order 
degrees of freedom, but with lower dimensionality. It is gen-
erated by sensorimotor skills, which open new possibilities for 
the organism to act in an environment, but remain dependent 
on the external conditioning. However, situation is different 
in the case of organisms with higher-order cognitive skills, 
which involve the conscious control of actions, which means 
the possibility to access some multidimensional degrees of 
freedom. Put in these terms autonomy depends on the ability 
of the organism to access some degrees of freedom of higher 
complexity, to enhance its degree of freedom through its cou-
pling with the environment, as a result of its bodily skills, and 
to consciously control and monitorize its degree of freedom, 
as a result of its higher-order cognitive skills.
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